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The realism that did not speak its name: E.H. Carr’s diplomatic 
histories of the twenty years’ crisis 
Abstract 
E.H. Carr was one of Europe’s preeminent thinkers in the field of international affairs. Yet 
his contribution to International Relations theory is continually questioned. Realists depict 
Carr as a quintessential realist; revisionists draw from his wider corpus to qualify his 
contribution. Although not inaccurate, the revisionist literature is incomplete as it neglects a 
number of Carr’s diplomatic histories. Refocusing on these, especially the manner in which 
traces of Ranke’s the primacy of foreign affairs tradition are evident, this paper points to a 
more conservative and less critical Carr. Utilising an interpretivist framework, this shift in 
traditions of thought is explained by the dilemmas Carr faced. Although works of history 
rather than theory, the paper contends that Carr’s diplomatic histories remain relevant in IR, 
particularly with regard to the embedded criticism of realpolitik they contain. This realisation 
is made evident through a reading of Carr in parallel with the concept of tragedy.   
Introduction 
History begins when men begin to think of the passages of time in terms not of natural 
processes…but a series of specific events in which men are consciously involved and which 
they can consciously influence…Man now seeks to understand, and to act on, not only his 
environment but himself.1 
The above passage from What is History can be applied to modern International Relations 
(IR) theory. Sylvest notes that the ‘history of international thought, broadly understood, is 
now a fast-growing field’.2 IR’s historiographical turn has resulted in a conscious effort to 
revisit, revise and deepen our understanding of IR theory and the history of international 
thought. This has resulted in a questioning of the discipline’s foundational myths, concepts 
and categories.3 It has also led to a veritable cottage industry challenging tired understandings 
of canonical, typically realist figures.4 Potentially traced to Ashley’s attempt to create a 
wedge between classical and modern forms of realism,5 the movement has sought to chart 
intellectual and epistemological linkages between classical theorists and contemporary 
critical theorists. This has involved a greater appreciation of the critique of modernity 
contained within the classical works; a greater recognition of the influence of Mannheim and 
                                                 
1 E.H. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin, 1964), p. 134.  
2 Casper Sylvest, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: Making Progress? (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2009), p. 5.  
3 See, for instance, Brian Schmidt, ‘The historiography of academic International Relations’, Review of 
International Studies, 20:4 (1994), pp. 349–367; Peter Wilson, ‘The myth of the first great debate’, Review of 
International Studies, 24:5 (1998), pp. 1–16; Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Where are the idealists in interwar 
International Relations?’, Review of International Studies, 32:2 (2006), pp. 291–308; Brian Schmidt (ed.) 
International Relations and the Great First Debate (London: Routledge, 2012).  
4 This literature is impressively large and growing. Indicative texts include, Richard N. Lebow, The Tragic 
Vision of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition 
and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Seán Molloy, The 
Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Michael C. 
Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Duncan Bell (ed.), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
5 Richard K. Ashley, ‘The poverty of neorealism’, International Organization, 38:2 (1984), pp. 225–286. 
the Frankfurt school on the classical works, especially with regard to the conditionality of 
knowledge; and a desire to point to the misreading of the classical realist works by modern 
realists.6 Although undoubtedly the vast majority of work in this vein has focused on the 
iconic Hans J. Morgenthau, a significant number of scholars have turned their intellectual 
spades onto the fertile ground left by Britain’s equally iconic figure, E.H. Carr. Carr’s 
previously one-dimensional characterisation, in turn, has increasingly been destabilised.7  
As will be shown in the first section, recent advances in scholarship in Carr have sought to 
deepen our understanding of his work and his place in the IR discipline by: i.) undertaking a 
closer and more thorough reading of his most (in)famous work, The Twenty Years’ Crisis; 
and ii.) developing a broader appreciation of his work as a whole by situating The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis alongside his other pre- and post-war scholarship. The point of this essay is not 
to challenge this development outright; nor do I wish to suggest that the broadening and 
deepening of our understanding of Carr is inaccurate. Instead, I use the space below to 
suggest that the revisionist turn with regards to E.H. Carr is incomplete because it has 
hitherto overlooked a number of diplomatic histories of the twenty years’ crisis that he 
produced in the course of his long and productive career. Turning to these, and particularly in 
focusing on the manner that they reflect the Primat der Außenpolitik tradition, I suggest that 
in his diplomatic histories we find a more conservative and traditional realism and a less 
critical realism.  
Utilising an interpretivist framework that allows for an exploration of the dilemmas that 
influence a thinker’s traditions of thought, this article accordingly seeks to explore Carr’s 
evolution from a radical international political theorist into a conservative historian. Focusing 
on three works on Soviet affairs that he produced at the twilight of his career, the paper 
explores the influence that Ranke’s the primacy of foreign affairs tradition had on Carr, if 
indirectly and implicitly. Although traditional histories, which separates Carr from the North 
American realist tradition, and certainly lacking in critical theorising vis-à-vis his inter-war 
work, it is argued that these works still have contemporary relevance for Carr-specific 
scholars and IR theory more broadly. In closing, the paper reflects on how Carr’s final 
thoughts regarding the dénouement of the twenty years’ crisis may help us appreciate and 
understand this tragic figure.  
 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, William Bain, ‘Deconfusing Morgenthau: Moral inquiry and classical realism reconsidered’, 
Review of International Studies, 26:3 (2000), pp. 445–464; Murielle Cozette, ‘Reclaiming the critical dimension 
of realism: Hans J. Morgenthau on the ethics of scholarship’, Review of International Studies, 34:1 (2008), pp. 
5–27; William E. Scheuerman, ‘Realism and the Left: The case of Hans J. Morgenthau’, Review of International 
Studies, 34:1 (2008), pp. 29–51; Hartmut Behr and Amelia Heath, ‘Misreading in IR theory and ideology 
critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and neo-realism’, Review of International Studies, 35:2 (2009), pp. 327–349; Felix 
Rösch, ‘Puovoir, puissance, and politics: Hans Morgenthau’s dualistic concept of power’, Review of 
International Studies, 40:2 (2014), pp. 349–365. 
7 This one-dimensional depiction is still evident in certain quarters. Elman and Jensen, as an example, write that 
the classical realist research programme, which can be traced to the publication of The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 
hones in on the fact that the ‘desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity’. That is, ‘states 
are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities’; that for classical realists, ‘international 
politics can be characterized as evil’; and that ‘classical realism explains conflictual behavior by human 
failings’. Colin Elman and Michael Jenson (eds.), The Realism Reader (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 3.  
I. Carr’s realism with adjectives  
Carr revisionism has challenged realist orthodoxy. It is argued that realists oversimplify 
Carr’s work in two respects. First, realists undertake a one-dimensional reading of his most 
(in)famous work, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, which ignores the text’s subtleties and nuances.8 
Second, realists typically read The Twenty Years’ Crisis in isolation, failing to appreciate it in 
terms of the wider pre- and post-war literature that Carr produced.9 In challenging 
convention, revisionists have more clearly delineated Carr’s realism with a number of 
qualifying adjectives. 
Utopian realism can be traced to Booth.10 Calling Carr a ‘potential utopian realist’, Booth 
pointed to the positive and normative ideas Carr voiced regarding a more progressive post-
war order.11 Referring more widely to Carr’s corpus of work, Howe likewise contended that 
while Carr accepted aspects of realism he was nevertheless ‘confident that time, along with 
healthy measures of utopianism, would bring about a more peaceful and just international 
order’.12 More recent work by Kenealy and Konstantinos, whilst never using the label, also 
touches upon these ideas. Charting the principal ideas animating Carr’s pre- and post-war 
work, they stress Carr’s concern with building a new order following the Second World 
War.13 Applying this specifically to Carr’s writing on the state, Carr’s distinctive realism 
rested in the principle that power had to be directed toward a progressive goal.14 Utopian 
realism reminds us of the way in which Carr’s work was future-orientated, concerned 
ultimately with a more progressive international order. Critical realism, in contrast, connects 
Carr’s work to contemporary critical theory. Linklater, as an example, sought to ‘release Carr 
from the grip of the Realists and to highlight certain affinities between his writings on the 
state and critical theories of international relations’.15 Linklater’s central point was that Carr’s 
work was emancipatory given that he was concerned with transnational forms of community 
and citizenship.16 Likewise, Babík emphasises the influence of the Frankfurt school on Carr’s 
major texts, concluding that ‘the term “realism” simultaneously connoted for Carr many 
elements nowadays associated with critical theory’.17 Others stress Carr’s historical method 
and outlook, however. This can initially be traced to Cox’s emphasis on Carr’s historical 
materialism.18 It is Germain, however, who has made the most extensive case for the 
                                                 
8 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(reissued edition edited by Michael Cox, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. xiii.  
9 Peter Wilson, ‘Radicalism for a conservative purpose: The peculiar realism of E.H. Carr’, Millennium–Journal 
of International Studies, 30:2 (2001), pp. 123–136, at p. 125. 
10 Ken Booth, ‘Security in anarchy: Utopian realism in theory and practice’, International Affairs, 67:3 (1991), 
pp. 527–545. 
11 Ibid., pp. 530–531. 
12 Paul Howe, ‘The utopian realism of E.H. Carr’, Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 277–297, at 
p. 277.  
13 Daniel Kenealy and Konstantinos Kostagiannis, ‘Realist visions of European Union: E.H. Carr and 
integration’, Millennium–Journal of International Studies, 41:2 (2012), pp. 221–246. 
14 Ibid., pp. 241–242. 
15 Andrew Linklater, ‘The transformation of political community: E.H. Carr, critical theory and International 
Relations’, Review of International Studies, 23:3 (1997), pp. 321–338, at p. 324.  
16 Ibid., pp. 330–338.  
17 Milan Babík, ‘Realism as critical theory: The international thought of E.H. Carr’, International Studies 
Review, 15:4 (2013), pp. 491–514, at p. 504. See, also, Tim Dunne, ‘Theories as weapons: E.H. Carr and 
International Relations’, in Michael Cox (ed.), E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), pp. 217–233. 
18 Robert Cox, ‘Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond International Relations theory’, Millennium–
Journal of International Studies, 10:2 (1981), pp. 126–155, at p. 131.  
qualified historical realist label.19 Focusing on The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Nationalism and 
After, The New Society and What is History, Germain points to Carr’s stress on historical 
change and his balance of determinism and voluntarism to argue that Carr’s ‘approach is 
“realist” in terms of its practical acceptance of the structural parameters of every life and 
historical in terms of his method’.20 
One may think that the growth of interest in Carr’s work has exhausted all that could be 
known about his work. Such a view would be erroneous. Whilst no doubt accurate, the 
revisionist literature is currently incomplete. This is because it overlooks the work that Carr 
produced on Soviet foreign affairs in the twilight of his career. Although historical, and 
generally seen as relatively minor, they may have much to tell us about Carr’s political 
thought specifically and his thought toward IR more broadly. If it is true that we can only 
gain a deeper understanding of Carr’s thought as a whole by engaging with his oeuvre in its 
entirety, then the neglect of his historical work is an oversight in need of correction. 
II. Traditions and dilemmas 
To more clearly specify the problem: can we relate Carr’s pre- and post-war IR work, which 
has been depicted in more critical theoretical terms in the revisionist literature, with his more 
traditional histories of Soviet foreign affairs, which have often been marginalised in the 
revisionist literature (and indeed amongst realists)? More broadly, this is a question of how 
and why a scholar’s thought evolves over time. To address this question, it seems logical to 
turn to Bevirian interpretivism, outlined initially in The Logic of the History of Ideas and 
subsequently utilised to interpret inter alia international political thought.21  
In Logic Bevir outlined and defended an anti-foundationalist hermeneutic, which called for 
intellectual historians to translate the ‘people of the past to us today’.22 Studying the ideas of 
the past for Bevir meant recovering and reconstructing the meaning of said ideas.23 Meaning 
is thus crucial for interpretivists because they argue that ‘people behave as they do because of 
their beliefs and theories about how the world works’.24 An individual’s beliefs and theories 
of the world are not sui generis, however. This is because individuals cannot be isolated from 
society in any meaningful respect. Carr was aware of this notion. He made clear in What is 
History, ‘[that an individual’s] earliest ideas come…from others’.25 To understand this logic, 
                                                 
19 Randall Germain, ‘E.H. Carr and the historical mode of thought’, in Michael Cox (ed.), E.H. Carr: A Critical 
Appraisal (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 322–338. 
20 Ibid., p. 332.  
21 Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ian Hall and 
Mark Bevir, ‘Traditions of British international thought’, The International History Review, 36:5 (2014), pp. 
823–834; Leonie Holthaus, ‘L.T. Hobhouse and the transformation of liberal internationalism’, Review of 
International Studies, 40:4 (2014), pp. 705–727; Leonie Holthaus and Jens Steffek, ‘Experiments in 
international administration: The forgotten functionalism of James Arthur Salter’, Review of International 
Studies, 42:1 (2016), pp. 114–135. See, also, Mark Bevir and Roderick A.W. Rhodes, Interpreting British 
Governance (London: Routledge, 2003); Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hall, ‘Introduction: Interpreting 
British foreign policy’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15:2 (2013), pp. 164–174; 
Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hall (eds.) Interpreting Global Security (London: Routledge, 2014); Mark 
Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Pauline Schnapper, ‘Introduction: Interpreting British European policy’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 53:1 (2015), pp. 1–17; Mark Bevir and Oliver Daddow, ‘Interpreting Foreign Policy: 
National, comparative and regional studies’, International Relations, 29:3 (2015), pp. 273–287. 
22 Bevir, Logic, p. 158. 
23 Ibid., p. 31. 
24 Ian Hall, ‘The Promise and Peril of Interpretivism in Australian International Relations’, Australian Journal 
of Public Administration, 73:3 (2014), pp. 307–316, at p. 308. 
25 Carr, What is History, p. 31. 
Bevirian interpretivists refer to traditions. Traditions are conceived of as a set of beliefs and 
understandings that are received by an individual through socialisation processes.26 
Traditions can be transmitted in a variety of ways, e.g. through peers, parents and forms of 
political discourse, including texts.27 The idealised teacher-pupil relationship, although not 
necessarily formalised, is often used as a metaphor to explain traditions.28 The pupil receives 
knowledge from their teacher and, in turn, transmits this knowledge to subsequent 
generations. The idealised teacher-pupil relationship, however, fails to capture how traditions 
mutate over time. As Bevir explains, ‘As beliefs pass from teacher to pupil, so the pupil 
modifies and extends the themes, or conceptual connections, that linked [their] beliefs’.29 
Accordingly, Bevirian interpretivists refer to situated agency: whilst traditions may initially 
condition an individual’s beliefs, because individuals have agency to interpret and reinterpret, 
traditions ultimately do not determine individual beliefs.30 To flesh out this logic Bevirian 
interpretivists refer to dilemmas. Dilemmas are conceived of as ‘authoritative understandings 
that put into question…existing webs of belief’.31 In accepting new information as true, if 
said new information conflicts with an individual’s existing web of belief, an individual is 
compelled to reconsider their understandings of the world. In turn, an individual can 
‘retrench, revise, or even reject some or all of [their] inherited knowledge’.32 Importantly, 
individuals engage in this process innovatively and creatively. Carr’s and Gilbert Murray’s 
different responses to the Abyssinian crisis evidence this (Carr turned from liberal 
internationalism toward a realism infused with Marxism while Murray retrenched his liberal 
internationalist worldview).33 In the subsequent sections of this paper traditions and dilemmas 
are employed to help us chart and understand Carr’s evolution from critic to traditionalist 
historian. To do so, it is first necessary to outline important traditions of thought that he 
inherited and the salient dilemmas he faced in the course of his career.  
III.  Traditions and dilemmas in the thought of E.H. Carr  
Trying to unpack the traditions that influenced E.H. Carr is problematic, chiefly because he 
was exceedingly eclectic in his approach to political thought. Molloy even calls him ‘magpie-
like’ in this regard.34 His major pre-war work, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, was primarily a 
polemic undertaken to influence British political discourse with regard to Germany.35 
According to Carr, whilst ‘it was not exactly a Marxist work, [it] was strongly impregnated 
with Marxist ways of thinking, applied to international affairs’.36 Conditions of Peace, in 
contrast, was what Carr termed his ‘sort of liberal Utopia’.37 Although comparatively less 
analysis of Conditions has been undertaken, it would be reasonable to hypothesise that 
George Lloyd’s and Edward Wood’s (later Lord Halifax) The Great Opportunity influenced 
                                                 
26 Bevir, Logic, p. 200. 
27 Hall and Bevir, ‘Traditions’, p. 828.  
28 Bevir, Logic, p. 203. 
29 Bevir, Logic, p. 204 
30 Bevir et al., ‘Introduction’, p. 167. 
31 Bevir, Logic, pp. 221–222. 
32 Hall and Bevir, p. 829.  
33 Ibid., p. 829.  
34 Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism, p. 53. 
35 Charles Jones, E.H. Carr and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 46. 
36 E.H. Carr, ‘An Autobiography’, in Michael Cox (ed.), E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), pp. xii–xxii, at p. xix. 
37 Carr, ‘Autobiography’, p. xix.  
Carr’s more idealist prose.38 Nevertheless, those with a close working relationship with Carr 
recognise that he was very much influenced by the realist tradition.39 Carr struggled with 
realism, however. His 28th December 1938 diary entry records that he was ‘Still on realism. 
Still very odd’.40 In turn, Carr’s interpretation of the realist tradition was innovative and 
creative. This is particularly true with regard The Twenty Years’ Crisis. It actually contained 
two realisms: a conservative, practical and pragmatic realism versus a radical, theoretical and 
critical realism.41 Whereas the former, which was evident most clearly in the text’s second 
chapter, was influenced by the conservative realist tradition, the latter which was most 
prominent in the text’s fifth chapter, was influenced more readily by Marxism broadly and 
Mannheim’s Standortgebundenheit des Denkens more specifically.42  
The conservative realist tradition includes ideas known commonly as the Primat der 
Außenpolitik (the primacy of foreign affairs), which can be traced to Leopold von Ranke in 
terms of philosophy and Otto von Bismarck in terms of practice.43 Although Ranke did not 
explicitly use the term–instead it was coined by Wilhelm Dilthey–the Primat der 
Außenpolitik is virtually synonymous with the Rankean worldview.44 Ranke’s political theory 
is articulated most prominently in a number of articles he published in Historisch-Politische 
Zeitschrift, a journal he edited in the 1830s. Important here is “A dialogue on politics”, in 
which Ranke stressed themes such as the organic state, self-preservation and security, 
sovereignty and independence and political necessity.45 Crucial here are the supremacy of 
security, the necessity of alliances and the subversion of principles to expediency. Ranke saw 
state security as the first priority. The ‘supreme law of the state’ is to ‘organize all its internal 
resources for self-preservation’ he argued.46 Nevertheless, despite the primacy of sovereignty 
and independence, Ranke concluded that when threats were great enough alliance formation 
was a necessity. Writing on the anti-Napoleonic alliance, he wrote: ‘[it was only] the huge 
danger of a newly risen power, which threatened independence everywhere, [which] finally 
created, in the face of annihilation as it were, a common defense’.47 Lastly, for Ranke, what 
mattered in terms of international relations was not ideology or opinion but rather interest 
shaped by political necessity. In discussing the Austrian-Russian alliance and its dissolution, 
he concluded that there ‘is no trend of opinion, however dominant, which can break the force 
                                                 
38 George Lloyd and Edward Wood, The Great Opportunity (London: John Murray, 1919). Carr admitted in his 
biographical statement (see previous footnote) that he was ashamed of the harshness of The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis. This dilemma potentially explains his evolving thought between these publications.  
39 Jonathan Haslam argued that Carr was ‘ultimately indifferent’ to his image as a ‘hard-boiled advocate of 
Machtpolitik (Power Politics)’ because ‘he recognised the image to be not altogether inaccurate’. Jonathan 
Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 199–200. In terms of Carr and the realist and realpolitik traditions see Ian 
Hall, Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945–1975 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2012), pp. 29–34; John Bew, Realpolitik: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
pp. 177–181.   
40 Carr’s Appointment Diaries 1938, Carr Papers, Box 29, (Cadbury Research Library, University of 
Birmingham). 
41 Jones, E.H. Carr and International Relations, p. 60; Hall, Dilemmas of Decline, p. 33; Molloy, ‘Spinoza, 
Carr, and the ethics of The Twenty Years’ Crisis’, p. 261. 
42 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 11–21, 63–88.  
43 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815–1871 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 71. 
44 John Farenkopff, ‘The challenge of Spenglerian pessimism to Ranke and political realism’, Review of 
International Studies, 17:3 (1991), pp. 267–284, at pp. 269–272. 
45 Theodor von Laue, Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 
pp. 152–180. 
46 Ibid., p. 167.  
47 Ibid., p. 169.  
of political interests’.48 Also important is Ranke’s “The great powers”, which traced the rise 
of Prussia under Frederick II, the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars.49 Although 
historically dense, it is possible to draw out a major theme from this text: for Ranke, the 
internal development of the Prussian state was a product of the international relations it was 
situated within and subjected to.50 This is what Simms and Mulligan refer to as the 
descriptive aspect of the Primat der Außenpolitik, i.e. the notion that a state’s internal 
development is a product of its external relations.51 Or, as von Laue puts it, ‘Foreign affairs, 
then, were the supreme factor in political life’.52 Indeed, in “The great powers” Ranke, 
quoting Heraclitus’ maxim that war is the father of all things, basically contends that to 
understand the development of the European states and the system they inhabited one has to 
first appreciate the wars of the period.53 
Carr was familiar with both Ranke and Bismarck. His 19th August 1938 diary entry records 
that he read Bismarck.54 What is History indicates that he was equally aware of Ranke, 
particularly in terms of Rankean historiography.55 Whether Carr was familiar with Ranke’s 
Primat der Außenpolitik is debatable. However, Carr was certainly familiar with Meinecke’s 
inter-war work, which is evidenced by the fact that he cited it in The Twenty Years’ Crisis.56 
Meinecke, particularly prior to the Second World War, was in many respects the heir to the 
primacy of foreign affairs tradition.57 At the least, then, Carr inherited the tradition indirectly 
with Meinecke acting as a conduit. To bring some clarity so that a consideration of the 
influence of the primacy of foreign affairs tradition on Carr’s later historical work can be 
undertaken, following Simms,58 I distil the Primat der Außenpolitik to three aspects. First, 
security is prime because state’s have to consider their defence, security and territorial 
integrity above all else. Second, as a result, internal factors such as inter alia ideology that 
might preclude a state from seeking security can be overcome if political necessity dictates it. 
The example here is that ideologically divergent states may ally themselves if circumstances 
necessitate it. Third, although the external environment (i.e. geopolitics and geopolitical 
events) may condition policy, it does not determine it. Policy outcomes are open, that is, and 
agency is a historically real factor. 
Bevirian interpretivism maintains that dilemmas are crucial to understanding how an 
individual’s thoughts and ideas evolve over time. Dilemmas may explain, therefore, why Carr 
turned from a more radical, theoretical realism to a more pragmatic, conservative form of 
realism. Many dilemmas shaped Carr’s thought over the course of his scholarly career, which 
in turn influenced how he spun his web of beliefs. Notable was the Manchurian crisis and, as 
                                                 
48 Ibid., p. 172.  
49 Ibid., pp. 208–215. 
50 Ibid., p. 184 
51 Brendan Simms and William Mulligan, ‘Introduction’, in William Mulligan and Brendan Simms (eds.), The 
Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660–2000 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 1–14, at p. 
1. 
52 Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, p. 99. 
53 Ibid., p. 215.  
54 Carr’s Appointment Diaries 1938, Carr Papers, Box 29. 
55 Carr, What is History, pp. 8–9. 
56 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 15,88. On the relationship between Carr and Meinecke see Haslam, No 
Virtue, p. 185; Bew, Realpolitik, p. 179. 
57 Richard W. Sterling, Ethics in a World of Power: The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1958).  
58 Brendan Simms, The Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the 
Executive, 1797–1806 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 4–5. Simms, in his formulation, 
actually includes a fourth factor–crisis and drama. This can be distilled into the first category. 
previously mentioned, the Abyssinian crisis. The former led Carr to accept the conclusion 
‘that members of the League…were not prepared to resist an act of aggression committed by 
a powerful and well-armed state’ while the latter caused the realisation that ‘Great Britain 
was not less firm than France in her resolve not to be drawn into war with Italy’.59 The 
Prague crisis, which evidenced the collapse of the Munich settlement, also saw Carr reorient 
the meanings he attached to Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement.60 Indeed, it was perhaps 
Carr’s advocacy of appeasement that did much to influence his scholarly trajectory. In his 
autobiographical statement he reflected on his shame of the text’s ‘harsh “realism”’.61 In 
private correspondence to his publishers not long after The Twenty Years’ Crisis was 
published, he even implied that it was a plus that bookshops were not stocking–and had not 
even heard of–the work.62 The political climate in addition to the critical reviews of The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis in particular63 seemingly undermined his faith in his academic pursuits. 
When asked about his future research intentions in 1943, Carr responded that he did not feel 
‘sufficiently interested at this time to write anything of a purely historical or analytical 
character, and anything containing views or proposals about the future would almost 
inevitable be over-taken by events before it got into print’.64 Although he would later publish 
on nationalism and sovereignty, post-war he was sceptical about analytical and theoretical 
research. In one particular review of Ernest Woodward’s The Study of International Relations 
at University, he seemed to suggest that the content of IR was “what the academic” made it. 
In rejecting Woodward’s view that intellectual dilettantism had resulted in a lack of IR in 
universities, Carr asked ‘Is it not rather the natural result of the persistent failure to provide 
facilities in this country for organized modern historical research in the sense in which it was 
understood and practised in Germany before 1933 and is still understood and practised in the 
United States?’.65 Carr’s thoughts were evidently turning toward history; his empirical work 
toward the Soviet Union.66 Whilst The Twenty Years’ Crisis may have developed as a staple 
in the developing IR field in the United States at least, the shifting international environment, 
inter alia, meant that Carr was becoming something of an outcast.67 By looking at Carr’s later 
work on Soviet foreign affairs specifically, the subsequent section seeks to use these 
dilemmas as a backdrop for charting how Carr’s use of the realist tradition subsequently 
evolved from the more radical to the more conservative.   
IV. Carr’s diplomatic histories   
Carr wrote four diplomatic histories of the twenty years’ crisis: Britain: A Study of Foreign 
Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War, German-Soviet Relations between 
the Two World Wars, 1919–1939 and his two books on Soviet interwar diplomacy, The 
Twilight of Comintern, 1930–1935 and The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War. Prior to 
his death in 1982, he also began work on a companion volume to Twilight entitled The 
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Popular Front, 1935–1938. Although the work was never completed or published, a 
posthumous edition was prepared by Robert W. Davies (who had previously collaborated 
with Carr on his History).68 Britain, which was published in the same year as The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis, provided an overview of British policy between the wars. Aspects of the work 
were directed toward defending the policy of appeasement, especially after the Prague crisis 
in 1939.69 German-Soviet Relations was published in 1951 and was drawn from lectures Carr 
gave for the Albert Shaw Lectures in Baltimore. Theoretically ideas found in both Britain and 
German-Soviet Relations may also reflect the primacy of foreign affairs tradition. However, 
the subsequent analysis focuses specifically on Carr’s histories of Soviet foreign affairs as a 
coherent set of ideas produced in a relatively coherent timeframe, i.e. in the final years of his 
life. To attempt to analyse works that span forty years may run the risk of presenting an 
idealised and timeless portrait of Carr, which would obviously stand in stark contrast to the 
intepretivist method employed here.  
Raison d’état  
As outlined above, this refers to the principle that state security is prime because state’s have 
to and indeed should consider their defence, security and territorial integrity above all other 
matters.70 It can be shown that in many respects Carr’s diplomatic histories of Soviet foreign 
affairs during the twenty year reflect the principle of raison d’état. Take Twilight as an 
example. Carr begins by charting the principal security threat facing the Soviet Union in the 
early 1930s. In the wake of the great depression and as the international system edged toward 
chaos, Moscow’s chief anxiety was that ‘the western Powers would seek to solve their 
difficulties, and sink their differences, in combined action against the USSR’.71 In turn, this 
meant that maintaining proper ‘relations with Germany were a matter of supreme importance’ 
as a hedge against a united capitalist coalition.72 Hitler’s ascendancy to power and the rise of 
a revisionist Japan, however, caused a volte-face in Soviet strategy. By the mid-1930s 
Germany’s more aggressive foreign policy in particular carried a ‘fresh threat to the USSR’, 
created ‘increasing tension in Soviet-German relations’ and paved the way for détente 
between the Soviet Union and the western capitalist powers (the Soviet Union even joined the 
League of Nations in late 1934 and signed a mutual defence pact with France in 1935).73 For 
Carr this shift in Soviet policy, coupled with the subversion of the Comintern’s revolutionary 
agenda to Soviet security interests, was understood in terms of maintaining the defence and 
security of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the threat posed by Nazi Germany.74 This idea is 
carried forward in The Spanish Civil War where Carr details the manner in which Soviet 
strategy, particularly through the Comintern, became increasingly concerned with security 
and national interest over the promotion of revolution. Indeed, in her introduction to the 
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posthumously published work Tamara Deutscher noted that for Carr ‘Moscow’s attitude to 
Spain was dictated less and less by the raison de la révolution and more by the Soviet raison 
d’état’.75 In principle, this meant that despite pressure amongst ideologues for more support 
to the republicans and Leftists fighting Franco, this ‘pressure was subjected to the restraint of 
diplomatic expediency’.76 That is, Moscow was determined to ‘keep the foreign policy of the 
USSR in line with that of France and Britain, its political allies against the menace of the 
Fascist powers’.77 That is not to say that Soviet strategy was completely passive. Arms were 
supplied, military advisers were provided and Soviet influence via the Comintern was evident 
in political machinations that took place in Spanish politics.78 But these were undertaken 
covertly and lessened over time. What Carr referred to as ‘revolutionary ardour’ in Soviet 
foreign policy gave ‘place to the cool calculations of diplomacy’.79 Lurking behind this shift 
was the Soviet Union’s need to engage in a rapprochement with the western powers as a 
counterweight to the threat posed by Nazi Germany in particular.80 The threat from Germany, 
and the necessity of maintaining good relations with the western powers, was also a crucial 
ingredient in terms of Soviet strategy in the latter part of the 1930s. Indicative here was the 
way in which Carr portrayed the Soviet response to Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland. 
Although Maxim Litvinov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, like his western 
counterparts denounced Germany’s actions, ‘he did not separate himself from the 
temporizing attitude of his British and French colleagues’.81 The Soviet Union, at this 
juncture, was chiefly concerned with pursuing ‘a coalition with bourgeois states in a common 
front against Fascism’.82 For Carr, this explained Litvinov’s apprehension toward the 
remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Moreover, as with The Spanish Civil War, the Comintern’s 
revolutionary impulses were superseded by the aims of the popular front (an alliance with 
bourgeoisie parties in opposition to fascism) as a direct result of the threatening international 
environment.83 Raison d’état was evidently crucial to Carr’s interpretations of Soviet foreign 
affairs during the 1930s.  
International relations trump ideology 
This is equally true of the notion that political expediencies generated by international 
relations trump inter alia ideological aims. That is, Carr’s interpretation of Soviet foreign 
affairs during the 1930s emphasises the manner in which the revolutionary aims of the Soviet 
Union, and by extension the Comintern, were by necessity diluted. One of the principles put 
forth by Carr in Twilight, for example, made the case that in the 1930s the ‘world had become 
too dangerous a place for rash revolutionary adventures’.84 Moscow, in other words, 
gradually came to the view that revolutionary outbreaks would ‘provoke French intervention’ 
and ‘fan hostility to the USSR’.85 Over time, and as a result, the Comintern ‘came round 
slowly to the opinion that communist parties could profitably collaborate with other Left 
parties…even with parties which did not accept the revolutionary programme of 
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communism’.86 That is not to say that the suspension of ideological conflict was easy or took 
place evenly. Mutual antagonisms between the socialists and the communists in Germany, 
even after Hitler’s ascension to power, made political unity problematic.87 Nevertheless, by 
the mid-1930s, particularly owing to the influence of the Comintern’s then leader, Georgi 
Dimitrov, policy was dictated by the need for collaboration with the bourgeois left. And for 
Carr, this resulted from the necessities generated by the international relations of the period.88 
His interpretation of Soviet policy during the Spanish civil war reflected the same principle. 
In Spain the popular front was galvanised by the threat from Franco and the support he 
received from the fascist powers.89 In turn, a unity government composed of socialists and 
communists, although not anarchists, was established in the autumn of 1936.90 The conflict in 
Spain, from Carr’s perspective, also hurried the process he had identified in The Twilight. 
That is, despite facing stiff resistance from hardliners such as Wilhelm Knorin and Béla Kun, 
Dimitrov was able to undermine cherished communist doctrine and advance the principles of 
the popular and even national front.91 For Carr, this development was understood in terms of 
political necessity. The Spanish civil war, that is, was evidence of the manner in which 
‘leaders in Moscow’ were striving to ‘subordinate the distant prospects of proletarian 
revolution to the immediate emergency of building a broad basis of resistance to the Fascist 
danger’.92 The historical narrative was carried further forward by Carr in The Popular Front. 
His chapter on the French experience is indicative here. Unlike the German experience noted 
above, the French communist party was better placed for political cohabitation. ‘France’, 
wrote Carr, ‘was continuously conscious of the military thrust from Nazi Germany’. In turn, 
the French communist party could ‘sound a patriotic note and take its stand with parties of a 
different social complexion on a common platform of national defence against Fascist 
oppression’.93 Political necessity, in other words, meant ideological compromise. In terms of 
Soviet foreign affairs more specifically, what Carr–perhaps controversially–depicted as the 
victory of realism over idealism was also crucial to his historical narrative.94 ‘In Moscow’, 
wrote Carr, ‘the building of a firm alliance with the western powers to counter the Fascist 
threat seemed the supreme and over-riding aim of Soviet foreign policy’.95 Stalin had, for 
Carr at least, refashioned the Comintern–subverted cherished ideology in other words–in the 
name of political expediency.96  
Context conditions but does not determine 
As others have noted, Carr was not a determinist.97 Instead, he tried to find an appropriate 
balance or synthesis between voluntarism and determinism, structure and agency or context 
and conduct.98 This outlook is equally evident in his histories of Soviet foreign affairs during 
the latter half of the twenty years’ crisis. In turn, his historical writing chimed with ideas 
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outlined previously as reflecting the primacy of foreign affairs tradition. This is particularly 
evident in Twilight were Carr touched upon Stalin’s relatively passive role in Soviet foreign 
affairs. Particularly in the first half of the 1930s Stalin, according to Carr, was chiefly 
concerned with economic and political priorities on the domestic front. Rather than 
exercising control, he left foreign affairs, in terms of both Narkomindel and the Comintern, in 
the hands of Litvinov.99 Stalin’s reluctance or indecision, from Carr’s vantage, ‘prolonged an 
anomalous situation in which officials of Comintern spoke with different voices, and 
directives issue to communist parties were conflicting and indecisive’.100 Hitler’s ascension to 
power may have radically transformed the threat to the Soviet Union, but leaders still have to 
perceive and react to the international context. In that respect, the international context 
conditioned but did not determine Soviet foreign policy. Carr even noted how Stalin initially 
saw no threat in Hitler and the Nazis, believing that if they did come to power they would be 
principally concerned with looking westward.101 Similar ideas are evident in The Spanish 
Civil War. Italian and German intervention in the civil war could have potentially rewritten 
the European balance of power.102 Russian policy toward the conflict, however was relatively 
limited–as was the response from France and Britain.103 Domestic conditions–notably in 
Britain the presence of the Conservative government and the privatised armament industry 
and in France factional disputes amongst the leadership–influenced the direction of policy.104 
For the Soviets, Carr believed that it was not simply diplomatic manoeuvring prompted by 
political necessity that mattered. He also believed that capabilities were an important factor in 
explaining Soviet policy. Both the ‘Comintern and the Soviet government were concerned to 
prevent Franco’s victory’, he wrote, ‘yet neither had at their disposal adequate means to 
achieve this purpose’.105 In The Popular Front, Carr also took care to point to the manner in 
which ideas regarding security and defence policy can be driven by factions. In particular, 
with regard to the principle of the popular front, Carr identified a ‘covert struggle’ in both 
communist parties and the Comintern leadership regarding the righteousness of the popular 
front doctrine.106 The international environment certainly provided the context for Soviet 
foreign affairs in the 1930s, but individuals and institutions–and importantly disputes 
between them–mediated its effects.107  
The last point indicates that Carr’s diplomatic histories demonstrate concerns beyond the 
primacy of foreign affairs in Soviet foreign policy in in the inter-war era. One of his major 
concerns in each of the three works was in charting the political and ideological disputes and 
differences between Moscow, Comintern spokesman and foreign communist parties.108 Like 
aspects of his monumental History,109 the three works on Soviet foreign affairs offered a fine-
grained and highly detailed account of the institutions, personalities and factions involved in 
Soviet foreign affairs during the twenty years’ crisis. Ranke’s primacy of foreign affairs may 
have not, therefore, been the defining inspiration behind Carr’s histories of Soviet foreign 
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affairs. Nevertheless, traces of Ranke are evident, even if silent, which is a point I will return 
to below.  
V. The twenty years’ crisis, history and tragedy  
From the preceding discussion it is evident that Carr’s often overlooked histories of Soviet 
foreign affairs speak in places to the primacy of foreign affairs tradition. This interpretation 
of his work is certainly of interest to Carr-specific scholars. More importantly, the approach 
outlined above, i.e. the interpretivist framework of traditions and dilemmas, offers a starting 
point for thinking about the progress and evolution of his scholarly career and thought, 
particularly from the IR theorist to conservative historian. However, recovering Carr’s 
histories–or at least recognising their potential significance–has greater implications, 
especially in terms of the how we think about the realist canon. Lumping together Carr, 
Morgenthau and Waltz, Palan and Blair conclude that their respective theories of the state 
result from the ‘explosion of ideas in the nineteenth century, particularly in Germany, which 
gave to rise to the modern…version of the realist theory of international relations’.110 Leaving 
aside the question of an unbroken and timeless realism stretching from nineteenth century 
Germany (if not before) into the interwar period and then Cold War era, the notion of a 
shared heritage does raise some provocative questions about the relationship between Carr’s 
diplomatic histories of Soviet foreign affairs and realist work published in a similar era, 
although in the North American tradition. Lebow calls Ranke ‘a nineteenth-century precursor 
of Kenneth Waltz’.111 There is logic behind this reasoning. Waltz fleshed out his socialisation 
mechanism (the principle that the competitive nature of the system compels states to act in a 
similar manner) with reference to the taming of the Soviet Union’s revolutionary aims 
(interestingly enough by way of a reference to Theodore von Laue).112 Walt’s The Origins of 
Alliance is also indicative here. One of the principal arguments in this monograph was the 
idea that alliance formation was a product less of shared ideology and more a product of 
political expediency generated by external threat.113 Primed, to borrow from Steele,114 for 
approaching Carr through the revisionist literature, I was puzzled when reading Carr, thinking 
Walt and hearing Waltz.  
This argument has recently been advanced by Parent and Baron.115 Akin to the revisionist 
literature identified in footnote six of this article, they argue that contemporary realists–they 
specifically identify Waltz and Mearsheimer–have misread the classical works of 
Morgenthau and Carr amongst others (with regards to Carr they refer specifically to his 
abridged History). Where they detract from the aforementioned revisionist literature, is that 
they seek to highlight affinities between “classical” realists (for want of a better word) and 
those realists commonly identified as neorealists. They argue that the common neorealist 
charges brought against the mid-twentieth century writers–specifically that they focused on 
human nature to the detriment of structure and were theoretically unsophisticated–are 
overstated. Reviewing the centrality of key concepts across realists in time, notably anarchy 
and its consequences, they conclude that ‘the classics are tightly allied with structural 
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analysis and extremely consistent with neorealism’.116 Moreover, they contend that there is a 
lot more theory in the classical works than is generally recognised. Turning again to Carr 
specifically, and quoting liberally from What is History, they point to his focus on cause as 
evidence of his concern with theory, if from a historical explanatory basis.117 Overall, this 
allows them to make the case that ‘classical realists escape charges of human nature realism 
and theoretical incompetence’ by ‘explaining the same patterns with essentially the same 
concepts and logic as neorealists’.118 From this vantage, part of the glue binding neorealists 
and classical realists is the shared intellectual inheritance from the nineteenth century German 
realists, Meinecke in particular and by extension Ranke.119 
One could argue that the commensurability thesis is overdone. Whilst Carr’s diplomatic 
histories of Soviet foreign affairs during the interwar era may share an intellectual inheritance 
with the North American realist tradition, there are evident differences, especially in terms of 
incommensurate underlying understandings of history. This is the basis of the interpretivist 
claim, and its strength in terms of analysing intellectual thought. Traditions are ‘a starting 
point’; they do not determine how an individual incorporates ideas into their existing web of 
beliefs.120 Carr and notable neorealists may have been influenced by the Rankean tradition of 
foreign affairs, either directly or indirectly, but their respective use, understanding and 
development of said tradition are ultimately unique and based on creative agency. In 
particular, there is an evident divergence in terms of philosophy of history. Whilst neorealists 
typically work within a history without historicism tradition, Carr, at least in his histories of 
Soviet foreign affairs, worked from a traditional even Rankean approach to history.121 History 
without historicism is typically concerned with the general over the particular. The historical 
record is seen as a testing ground for deductive theoretical propositions and hypotheses. As 
Hobson and Lawson state, neorealists generally use history, chiefly secondary sources, to 
verify, refine and refute their theoretical propositions.122 Traditional history, in contrast, is 
typically atheoretical (at least outwardly so);123 is concerned chiefly with (if not fetishizes) 
primary, archival sources (is based on historical fact in other words); and seeks to construct 
accurate causal accounts of historical events.124 Ironically given Carr’s criticism of Rankean 
historiography in What is History, there are evident traces of this traditional approach in his 
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histories of Soviet foreign affairs.125 His diplomatic histories are filled with what Haslam 
refers to as Carr’s ‘“needlework”’ – that is ‘detailed empirical research and writing’.126 
Consequently they reflect the traditional history approach just outlined. Carr’s preface to 
Twilight clearly indicates that he sought to ‘narrate what happened in Moscow and what 
happened in the parties [of the Comintern]’.127 The works are based on archival research, 
with a specific focus on memoirs, typically bypassing his earlier reflective comments on this 
method.128 Moreover, his three works on Soviet foreign affairs were largely atheoretical. 
Although it is possible to detect a Rankean sensibility in them, in terms of the primacy of 
foreign affairs, Carr made no explicit use or attested to a concern with theory here. His works 
on Soviet foreign affairs, in other words, contained a realism that never spoke its name.  
If Carr’s histories of Soviet foreign affairs during the twenty years’ crisis are traditional 
histories, then this surely puts them at odds with his earlier work. From the interpretivist 
perspective, this is not problematic. In the course of a scholarly career an intellectual may 
come to exhibit or espouse thought that is radically different from traditions that they had 
previously imbibed from. As Bevir explains, ‘[an individual may] even reject [a tradition] in 
a way that might make it anything but constitutive of the web of beliefs that they [later] come 
to hold’.129 We can see this through a brief illustrative contrast between Carr’s diplomatic 
histories and The Twenty Years’ Crisis (and indeed his other inter-war work), with the latter 
exhibiting a more critical-theoretical edge.130 The Twenty Years’ Crisis speaks more strongly 
to the radical, theoretical and critical tradition of Mannheim as opposed to the Primat der 
Außenpolitik tradition of Ranke. Drawing from Mannheim, and applying it to the work of 
Morgenthau, Behr and Heath suggest that Standortgebunden means ‘nothing more than the 
theoretical acknowledgement of the socio-politically contingent character of history, and the 
practical recognition of a certain, if temporary, historical condition and subsequent way of 
acting under these conditions’.131 These ideas are certainly evident in The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis. Indeed, Evans over thirty years ago in this very journal concluded that uniting Carr’s 
interwar oeuvre was the ‘notion that the principles of one age cannot without great danger be 
carried over to another where the problems and the context are different’.132 One passage 
from The Twenty Years’ Crisis can illuminate on this:  
In a limited number of countries, nineteenth-century liberal democracy had been a brilliant 
success. It was a success because its presuppositions coincided with the stage of development 
reached by the countries concerned…But the view that nineteenth-century liberal democracy 
was based, not on a balance of forces peculiar to the economic development of the period and 
the countries concerned, but on certain a priori rational principles which had only to be 
applied in other contexts to produce similar results, was essentially utopian.133 
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Carr’s interwar work more broadly was concerned with progressive change. Progressiveness, 
according to Wilson, is the ‘belief that the world does not have to look the way that it does, 
and that through reason, courage, imagination and determination it is possible to arrive at a 
better way of being and living’.134 Sewed through Carr’s better known work in the interwar 
era are hopes for and imaginations of a new and more stable political order. This is evident in 
his discussion of peaceful change, the prospect of post-national sovereignty and the 
elimination of the profit motive from foreign policy. It is also apparent in Nationalism and 
After where Carr ruminates on the prospects of a more peaceful post-war order based on 
individual rights, functional intergovernmental institutions and common moral principles. 
Carr’s call for the ‘revolution [to] begin at home’ in The Conditions of Peace and his 
subsequent outline of a post-war social democratic welfare coupled with centralised planning 
also illustrate his progressiveness.135 
This critical edge is not evident in Carr’s diplomatic histories; the dilemmas Carr experienced 
(previously outlined) potentially explain this shift from radical theoretician to conservative 
historian. His diplomatic histories as a story of what was are emptied of the progressive 
aspects of his other analytical work that focused on what could be. It should be clear that 
Carr’s explanatory accounts of the twenty years’ crisis fall outside the current disciplinary 
trend of reading the classics as critical theory (or at least looking for critical theory insights in 
the classical works). Morgenthau’s American Foreign Policy does likewise, and could be 
equally mined for the Primat der Außenpolitik tradition.136 Thus, while it may be true that 
Carr (and indeed Morgenthau) drew from traditions of thought not typically associated with 
contemporary realist theorising, i.e. the Frankfurt school and Marx,137 they equally drew from 
traditions of thought, i.e. the Primat der Außenpolitik, not typically associated with critical 
theory. 
Prima facie, then, Carr’s diplomatic histories of Soviet foreign affairs during the twenty 
years’ crisis may offer little for contemporary IR theory. They are, after all, history (and a 
traditional history at that). Such a view would be inaccurate, however. Reading the final 
chapter, “The descent into chaos”, from his final unpublished work, The Popular Front, it is 
possible to interpret in Carr a Lebowean sensibility. Tracing the tragedy genre and concept to 
fifth-century Athens, Erskine and Lebow, drawing from Aristotle, point to the importance of 
hamartia, peripeteia and anagnorisis.138 Hamartia refers to an error of judgement on the 
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protagonist’s part. Peripeteia refers to the reversal of fortune that results from the 
protagonist’s hamartia. Anagnorisis is the cathartic revelation and transformation of self that 
results from the realisation of the initial error of judgement. Tragedy as a narrative device is 
concerned with inter alia highlighting human limitations and fallibility, particularly in terms 
of deliberation and decision-making in terms of competing ethical and moral 
commitments.139 The ‘core insight of tragedy’ is therefore the process of learning it 
engenders, specifically in terms of knowing ‘one’s own limits’.140 Utilising the works of 
Thucydides, Clausewitz and Morgenthau, the Lebowean sensibility depicts the bonds 
between community, cooperation, justice, ethics and honour and, amongst other things 
criticises the expediency of realpolitik in terms of its self-defeating consequences.141 This 
sensibility allows us to recognise, as Lebow writes, ‘that communal bonds are fragile and 
easily undermined by the unrestrained pursuit of unilateral advantage…When this happens, 
time-honored mechanisms of conflict management…may not only fail to preserve the peace 
but may make domestic and international violence more likely’.142 
These concepts can illuminate upon Carr’s thoughts, especially with regard to the 
appeasement of Nazi Germany and Munich in particular. Following the annexation of Austria 
by Germany in 1938, which Carr identified as a turning point in his view of Germany,143 
increased tensions and insecurity cast a shadow over European politics. Czechoslovakia was 
widely seen as Hitler’s next target. The Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty and the 
Soviet-Czech mutual assistance treaty meant that the Soviet Union was obliged to assist 
Czechoslovakia in a conflict, but only if France did. In The Popular Front Carr portrays 
Soviet leaders, particularly Vladimir Potemkin and Maxim Litvinov, in the run up to Munich 
as adhering firmly to the principles of collective security and collective action against an 
aggressor.144 In France, in contrast, Carr noted that the ‘forces driving France into 
accommodation with Germany were gathering strength’.145 Likewise, the resignation of the 
British Foreign Secretary indicated that Britain too sought ‘a closer relationship with 
Germany’.146 This bewildered the Soviets who saw collective action as the most effective 
means to confront Nazi aggression.147 The result of French and British prevarication toward 
Hitler, and in pressing the Czechoslovakian government into appeasing Germany, meant that 
the Soviet Union was able to escape from the crisis without ‘public disgrace’.148 In ensuring 
no ‘loss of credit’, the Soviet Union ensured its honour; Britain and France on the other hand 
‘[betrayed], not only their obligations, but…their interests’.149  
This narrative of honour/honourless actions in terms of the Munich crisis is important for a 
number of reasons. Broadly it illustrates the importance that Carr attached to cooperative or 
collective action over self-interested or unilateral action in his final interpretation of the 
dénouement of the twenty years’ crisis. Had Britain and France adhered to their obligation–
acted honourably in other words–then the Soviet Union too would have been forced into 
                                                 
139 Ibid., p. 6.  
140 Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics, p. 20.  
141 Ibid., p. 16. 
142 Ibid., p. 257. 
143 Carr, ‘Autobiography’, p. xix.  
144 Carr, Popular Front, pp. 174–175. 
145 Ibid., p. 178.  
146 Ibid., p. 179.  
147 Ibid., p. 179. 
148 Ibid., p. 184–185 
149 Ibid., p. 187. 
defending Czechoslovakia against naked German aggression.150 It also illustrates the manner 
in which Carr interpreted–or perhaps even reinterpreted–realpolitik at this juncture. It was 
consequential in that it directly led to Soviet mistrust and the eventual tilt to Nazi Germany 
and, not least, the Second World War.151 For Carr specifically, given his earlier advocacy and 
then defence of appeasement (in terms of expediency), it serves to frame his hamartia (his 
advocacy), his peripeteia (his irrelevance to IR) and anagnorisis (his realisation of his error 
in judgement).152 The tragic can therefore not just help us conceptualise world politics but 
can also help us come to grips with particular theorists who, in the words of Morgenthau, 
‘showed their faces above the crowd’.153   
VI. Conclusion 
Significant research has sought to challenge tired depictions of classical figures in our 
discipline. Long viewed–and still viewed in some quarters–as a realpolitiker par excellence, 
to borrow from Deutscher,154 Carr’s thought has increasingly been revisited and revised. 
Where once textbook caricatures littered the landscape, the subtleties and nuances of Carr’s 
international thought now dominate, and quite rightfully so. Not seeking to challenge this 
movement, this paper has nevertheless demonstrated a significant gap in terms of the general 
neglect of Carr’s later work. Carr’s writing career spanned from the 1930s until his death in 
1982. To neglect his later work is anomalous. Although his two published monographs and 
his unpublished and unfinished symphony on Soviet foreign affairs may be historical, they 
are nevertheless still concerned with interstate diplomacy. Employing an interpretivist 
framework, this paper has made a first-cut at understanding the relationship between the Carr 
of The Twenty Years’ Crisis, amongst other inter-war and post-war texts, and Carr the 
traditional Soviet historian. Locating the scholarly dilemmas which he faced following the 
Second World War, this paper has charted Carr’s movement from a radical and progressive 
realism to a more conservative and traditional realism (interestingly the two realisms that are 
found, if implicitly, in The Twenty Years’ Crisis). Contained within his historical works on 
Soviet foreign affairs, if in silence, are traces of the Primat der Außenpolitik tradition. 
Although works of history, Twilight, The Spanish Civil War and The Popular Front are 
nevertheless still relevant today. Not least, they depict international relations at a time of 
crisis. The ideological struggles and conflict between left and left and between left and right 
contained within may be of a radically different era; but one cannot help think that 2016 
marked a turning point in international politics. If so, Carr in his totality may be more 
relevant than he ever was. More specifically, however, Carr’s histories of Soviet foreign 
affairs may serve to illuminate upon the tragedy of his scholarly work. The Popular Front, in 
particular, can be best thought of as the final stage in his movement from advocate of 
Munich, to defender of Munich to critic of Munich. The tragedy framework and a Lebowean 
sensibility, it is posited here, help us understand and appreciate Carr’s intellectual journey. 
Embedded within his histories of Soviet affairs, especially in terms of the dénouement of the 
twenty years’ crisis, is a lived critique of realpolitik, which tragically the discipline has 
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hitherto overlooked. Perhaps Carr’s lived experience of realpolitik explains why the realism 
in his diplomatic histories did not speak its name.  
